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Abstract
Technologies under development in the field of radiotherapy offer the possibility of automating many of the remaining functions 
that are currently carried out by radiotherapy staff. If adopted, they are likely to significantly change the roles of health care 
professionals and modify the potential error profile of specific radiotherapy procedures. In this paper, a combination of allocation 
of functions methods, including Levels of Automation (LOA) [1] and Meister’s prescriptive method [2], and the Human Error 
Analysis and Reduction Technique (HEART) [3] were used as the basis for an evaluation of the impact of increasing automation
on the potential for human error in Low-Dose Rate Prostate Brachytherapy (LDRPB). An IDEFØ model of the brachytherapy 
treatment process previously developed by the authors was the starting point for the analysis. The process “Perform Implant” 
which currently has sub-processes that are under direct human control and others that utilize advanced technology was selected 
for analysis. The LOA model was applied to “Perform Implant” for three scenarios: current set-up, mixed-automaton and full 
automation. A modified set of risk criteria specified by the Irish Health Service Executive (HSE) [4] were used in conjunction 
with Meister’s method to select the most appropriate mix of automation for further analysis. HEART was then applied to both the 
current set-up scenario and the selected scenario and the outcomes were compared. The HEART analysis provided one 
justification for the selection of a particular human-automation mix, though caution should be exercised as HEART requires 
further validation in the context of healthcare systems.
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1. Introduction
The application of automation in a range of domains has resulted in significant improvements in the reliability of 
systems. However human factors and ergonomics practitioners hold the view that the implementation of automation 
without explicitly considering job and task design will contribute to significant system failures. This is particularly 
the case in situations where operators are asked to intervene at the margins of safety and there is a loss of situation 
awareness due to a mismatch in mental models. Significant work has been completed in relation to these issues in a 
number of safety related industries, for example, aviation, aerospace and the nuclear industry; however healthcare is 
currently actively endeavoring to catch up with them.
In this paper, the human error potential of two levels of automation scenarios for a radiotherapy procedure at a 
hospital in Ireland is examined; the current scenario and a more automated one. The later scenario was developed 
using a prescriptive procedure by Meister [2] which incorporated a set of modified risk criteria used by the Irish 
Health Services Executive (HSE) [4]. The Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) [3] was 
used to assess the human error potential of both scenarios.
1.1. Overview of radiotherapy and brachytherapy/LDRPB
The radiotherapy treatment process has the following generic stages, as shown in Fig. 1 below. The process 
begins when a patient is referred, typically by their General Practitioner, to an outpatient clinic for assessment by a 
consultant Radiation Oncologist. If the patient requires treatment, the oncologist’s clinical notes and the prescribed 
treatment protocol will be entered in the patient file and the patient will be added to the department’s treatment 
schedule. He/she will undergo pre-treatment imaging, which includes Computerized Tomography (CT) scanning, 
simulation and patient marking for later treatment. A treatment plan will be developed based on the CT scan in
conjunction with the prescribed treatment protocol. This plan will be used to treat the patient unless abnormalities 
are detected during the patient and treatment review, in which case changes to the treatment plan will be made under 
the supervision of the Radiation Oncologist. 
Low Dose Rate Prostate Brachytherapy/LDRPB is a form of cancer treatment, where small radioactive seeds 
(usually Iodine-125) are permanently implanted into the patient’s prostate gland. The seeds are implanted during a 
single anaesthetised surgical procedure typically lasting 50-90 minutes, depending on the number of seeds to be 
implanted. The objective of the implantation procedure is to provide an isodose of radiation to the gland according 
to the treatment plan. The procedure is completed by a multidisciplinary team which includes a Radiation 
Oncologist, Medical Physicists, Anaesthetists, and Nurses. A real-time continuous ultrasound and on-line 3D 
dosimetry are used throughout. They provide real-time feedback to the team during the procedure allowing for a 
greater degree of flexibility, accuracy and quality of the completed implant. In the procedure studied, the radioactive 
seeds in the seed cartridge are loaded into the seed applicator; the seed applicator is then connected to the needles 
which have already been inserted into the prostate gland.  The seeds are then implanted manually under direct 
human control.
Fig. 1. Generic Radiotherapy Treatment Flowchart.
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1.2. Allocation of functions
Allocation of functions is the term used to describe the activity of determining the functions to be performed by 
different components within a human-machine system. Critics of the concept of allocation of functions have 
questioned its usefulness and validity [5] [6] [7].
At a conference on the topic in Galway, Ireland, a number of key concerns related to the topic were raised, 
including; the study of the nature of work and work systems, i.e. work is transformed by new artifacts and therefore 
the a priori specification of work based on existing systems is futile, and the issue of emerging and articulating work 
in new or updated systems [8]. However, it is regarded by many human factors professionals as a fundamental of the 
systems design process which can influence subsequent design thinking.
1.3. Levels of Automation (LOA)
Parasuraman et al. [1] present a model of human interaction with automation based on two dimensions; Stage of 
Human Information Processing and Level of Automation. The four broad classes of functions in the model are: 1. 
Information Acquisition, 2. Information Analysis, 3. Decision Selection, and 4. Action Implementation. The degree 
of automation is divided into ten levels, with level one indicating no automation and level ten indicating completely 
autonomous automation, see Parasuraman et al. [1]. The model is not intended as a tool that will provide detailed 
solutions with respect to allocation of functions. Parasuraman et al. [1] state that, “The model can be used as a 
starting point for considering what types and levels of automation should be implemented in a particular system. The 
model also provides a framework within which important issues relevant to automation design may be profitably 
explored”. It is for the latter purpose that the model was chosen for the work reported in this paper. The Levels of 
Automation (LOA) method by Parasuraman et al. [1] was used to assess the impact of automation decisions 
(allocations) on error potential in brachytherapy practice on. Three brachytherapy systems were modeled using the 
LOA approach: (1) The existing paperless system in a public hospital in Ireland (A1); (2) An envisioned system 
with a high degree of automation with some human decision making and control (A2); and (3) An alternative
envisioned system with potentially higher degrees of automation (A3).
1.4. Meister’s prescriptive method
Meister [2] reports on a formal comparative approach as the basis for making allocation of function decisions. 
The approach includes the identification of feasible design alternatives involving various human-automation 
combinations and the evaluation of these with respect to pre-agreed criteria. The overall procedure for the method is 
as follows: Write a narrative description of design alternatives; Establish criteria and their relative weights for the 
system, e.g. cost, performance, reliability, maintainability, personnel requirements; Establish relative weights for 
each design alternative; and Combine weights for criteria and alternative designs to select a final design.
In this study a modified version of the Irish Health Services Executive (HSE) risk criteria was used as the basis of 
the comparative analysis [9]. The following criteria were used: Injury; Patient Experience; Compliance; Clinical 
Continuity; Adverse Publicity; Financial Loss, Environment, Data/Information.
1.5. The Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART)
The Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) was designed to assist engineers to assess the 
likelihood and impact of human unreliability on system performance [3]. It was designed for application across a 
range of domains, as a quick, easily understood, systematic, repeatable and responsive tool, which identifies the 
major influences on human performance. HEART was built on data from a range of domains, e.g. power generation
including nuclear, transportation and fire safety. The HEART method deals with whole tasks rather than sub-tasks 
and is more flexible in its application than other HRA techniques, for example THERP and JHEDI [10] [11] [12].
HEART’s generic error classification and taxonomy are particularly useful for application in healthcare related 
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studies, as specific categories and taxonomies of Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) have yet to be determined for
this application domain. Chadwick and Fallon [13] applied it to a critical nursing task in radiotherapy.
2. Methods
The following methods were applied in the study: 
x An IDEFØ model of the Brachytherapy procedure was developed and the “Perform Implant” process was 
selected for analysis.
x Narratives of three scenarios for Levels of Automation of the “Perform Implant process” were composed:
ż (1) The existing paperless system in a public hospital in Ireland (A1);
ż (2) An envisioned system with a high degree of automation with some human decision making and control 
(A2); and
ż (3) An alternative envisioned system with potentially higher degrees of automation (A3). 
x Each scenario was described using Parasuraman et al. [1] Levels of Automation model.
x Meister’s [2] prescriptive method for allocation of functions was used to select the ‘Best’ Level of Automation 
scenario with respect to the modified HSE Risk Criteria [4].
x The HEART method [3] was used to compare the selected scenario (A2) for human error potential with the 
existing scenario (A1). 
3. Results
3.1. IDEFØ Model of Brachytherapy
The completed IDEFØ model contained 26 model diagrams with over 130 individual functions, detailing up to 6
hierarchical levels of analysis. An IDEFØ model of the process “Perform Implant” is shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. IDEFØ Diagram for the LDRPB Treatment Step ‘A3267 Perform Implant.’
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3.2. Perform Implant Scenarios and Levels of Automation (LOA)
The “Current Scenario (A1)” for “Perform Implant” has significant human involvement at all five stages. The
actors involved and the resources and data required are clearly identified in Fig.2 above. The main operator functions 
include manually preparing the seed applicator in accordance with the treatment plan (Nurse and Radiation 
Oncologist), manually attaching the seed applicator to the implanted needles (Radiation Oncologist), manually 
implanting the seeds while obtaining dosimetry feedback which allows for fine tuning of the implantation (Radiation 
Oncologist and Medical Physicist), passing the seed applicator to Nurse (Radiation Oncologist and Nurse) and 
finally checking on-line dosimetry of the patient at the end of the procedure (Radiation Oncologist and Medical 
Physicists). Subsequent tasks include ensuring that all radioactive seeds are accounted for. All decisions are within 
the remit of the Radiation Oncologist.
Under a “Mixed Automation Scenario (A2)”, the seed applicator would be prepared automatically based on the 
treatment plan and assembled to the needles without any human involvement using a robotic assistant in conjunction 
with standard manufacturing / assembly automation. The quality of the preparation and the assembly would be 
assessed by the Radiation Oncologist, the Nurse and Medical Physicist. The robotic assistant would implant the 
seeds through the needles progressively in discrete stages and await evaluation and approval by the radiation 
oncologist based on feedback from the on-line dosimetry before progressing to the next stage. Where problems arise, 
it would be possible for the oncologist to assume full manual control of the procedure in order to affect recovery.  
Finally, the results of the implantation would be presented to the radiation oncologist for sign-off.
Under a “Full Automation Scenario” the seed applicator would be prepared automatically based on the treatment 
plan and assembled to the needles without any human involvement using an autonomous robot in conjunction with 
standard manufacturing / assembly automation. A computer would check the quality of the preparation and assembly 
using advanced sensors. The robot would then implant the seeds through the needles and using the appropriate 
algorithms and feedback from the on-line dosimetry, adjust their position and the numbers of them implanted if 
necessary. The results would be presented to the oncologist to note but with no opportunity for change.
The three scenarios are summarized below in Fig. 3 using LOA by Parasuraman et al. [1] and in Table 1 
following Meister [2]. 
Fig. 3. Levels of Automation for the 3 Scenarios: Current (A1), Mixed Automation (A2) and Full Automation (A3).
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Table 1. Pair-wise comparison of the automation risk criteria.
I PE C CC AP FL E D/I Pair-wise 
comparisons
Injury (I) - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.25
Patient Experience (PE) 0 - 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.04
Compliance (C) 0 1 - 0 1 1 1 1 0.18
Clinical Continuity (CC) 0 1 1 - 1 1 1 0 0.18
Adverse Publicity (AP) 0 1 0 0 - 1 1 0 0.10
Financial Loss (FL) 0 1 0 0 0 - 1 0 0.07
Environment (E) 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0.00
Data/Information (D/I) 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 - 0.18
Table 2. Comparison of three automation scenarios: Current (A1), Mixed automation (A2) and Full automation (A3).
Individual Scenario Scores Summary Scenario 
Scores
A1 A2 A1 A3 A2 A3 A1 A2 A3
Injury 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 2 0
Patient Experience 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 2 0
Compliance 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2
Clinical Continuity 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 2 0
Adverse Publicity 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 1
Financial Loss 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 1 0
Environment 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2
Data/Information 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2
Table 3. Summary of risk criteria scores for three automation scenarios.
A1 A2 A3
Injury 0.25 0.50 0.00
Patient Experience 0.04 0.08 0.00
Compliance 0.00 0.18 0.36
Clinical Continuity 0.18 0.36 0.00
Adverse Publicity 0.00 0.20 0.10
Financial Loss 0.14 0.07 0.00
Environment 0.00 0.00 0.00
Data/Information 0.00 0.18 0.36
Total 0.61 1.57 0.82
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3.3. HEART method
The HEART method [3] was used to compare the selected scenario (A2) for human error potential with the 
existing scenario (A1). 
Table 4. Current Scenario (A1) HEART Output.
Type of Task: G Nominal Human Unreliability: 0.0004
Error Producing Conditions HEART Effect Analyst’s POA Assessed Effect
07 - Reversing action x 8.0 0.08 ((8.0-1) x 0.08) +1 = 1.56
15 - Operator inexperience x 3.0 0.65 ((3.0-1) x 0.65) + 1 = 2.30
19- Diversity of information x 2.5 0.05 ((2.5-1) x 0.05) + 1 = 1.07
23 - Unreliable instrumentation x 1.6 0.70 ((1.6-1) x 0.70) + 1 = 1.42
27- Physical capabilities x 1.4 0.78 ((1.4 -1) x 0.78) + 1 = 1.31
Assessed Nominal Likelihood of Failure: 0.0004 x (1.56 x 2.30 x 1.07 x 1.42 x 1.31) = 0.0028
Table 5. Selected Scenario (A2) HEART Output.
Type of Task: G Nominal Human Unreliability: 0.00008
Error Producing Conditions HEART Effect Analyst’s POA Assessed Effect
04 – Overriding features x 9.0 0.20 ((9.0-1) x 0.20) + 1 = 2.60
07 – Reversing action x 8.0 0.04 ((8.0-1) x 0.04) + 1 = 1.28
12 - Mismatch perceived risk x 4.0 0.50 ((4.0-1) x 0.50) + 1 = 2.50
15 - Operator inexperience x 3.0 0.75 ((3.0-1) x 0.75) + 1 = 2.50
19- Diversity of information x 2.5 0.01 ((2.5 -1) x 0.01) + 1 = 1.01
25 - Allocation of function x 1.6 0.20 ((1.6-1) x 0.20) + 1 = 1.12
Assessed Nominal Likelihood of Failure: 0.00008 x (2.60 x 1.28 x 2.50 x 2.50 x 1.01 x 1.12) = 0.0019
4. Discussion and conclusions
The approach adopted in this work proved to be beneficial both in terms of the results obtained and the lessons 
learned.
The ultimate weightings assigned to the risk criteria were consistent with the perspectives held by healthcare 
workers. Thus “Financial Loss” and “Environment” were viewed as low risk in comparison to “Injury”, “Clinical 
Continuity” and “Compliance.
The results of the HEART analysis supported the recommendations for LOA based on the outcomes from the 
application of the Meister prescriptive method for allocation of functions.  Scenario A2 was found to be the most 
appropriate human automation mix with respect to the selected risk criteria, with an Assessed Nominal Likelihood 
of Failure (probability of failure) of 0.0019. Scenario A1 had an Assessed Nominal Likelihood of Failure of 0.0028. 
The primary contributor to the difference in these scores was the use of a robotic arm in conjunction with standard 
manufacturing / assembly automation to replace the preparation and manual insertion of the radioactive seeds into 
the prostate gland using prepositioned needles. The main contributing Error Producing Condition (EPC) was the 
lack of an “obvious means of reversing an action”, i.e. recovery from error when positioning radioactive seeds.
The prescriptive approach recommended by Meister for determining allocation of functions decisions at a high
level facilitated broad discussions among the analysts about the merits of the respective systems. It also revealed 
their biases. However, it should be noted that the analysis was focused on risk and that the criteria used for decision 
making related exclusively to this area; at least in theory. For example, productivity in terms of optimum throughput 
was not given explicit consideration. Nevertheless, productivity concerns were unlikely to have been ignored as they 
are almost by definition implicit aspects of risk criteria such as “Business Continuity” and “Financial Loss”. 
Ultimately, risk criteria are not independent of other aspects of healthcare operations and it is difficult to ring fence 
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them exclusively for this kind of analysis. Meister’s approach also provided an auditable pathway for designers 
regarding decisions about an appropriate human-automation mix with respect to selected risk criteria for LDRPB. 
This pathway exits at a high level in terms of the relevant IDEFØ diagrams. The usefulness of the approach at lower 
IDEFØ levels is questionable as it would result in a proliferation of data for analysis particularly when other criteria 
in addition to risk are considered. It would also require infinitely more detailed scenario narratives at that level 
which would likely be speculative without further detailed design. On a positive note, its non-suitability for 
application at lower IDEFØ levels means that designers would not necessarily be a-priori constrained by allocations 
to people or automation in terms of design decision latitude at the detail design level.
The application of the LOA model provided a useful framework for consideration of the implications of specific 
mixes of human-automation for risk. As the author’s have previously pointed out, “The analysis encapsulated 
clearly the implications of achievable automation for functions in radiotherapy systems. However, it is clear that in 
order to answer detailed questions about operator roles the LOA model would need to be applicable at a task level. 
In order to achieve this, it may need to be combined with a model of human performance which supports direct
interaction with automation”. [9].
HEART has been recommended for use in healthcare as it is nominally a broadly applicable system which is 
independent of particular application domains and technologies. However, the analysts found that the generic task 
categories were not necessarily flexible enough to cover the variety of tasks in healthcare. For example, while Task 
G was the most appropriate for the ‘Perform Implant’ process, it specifically excludes tasks with significant job aids 
which were available to the brachytherapy team in this case. Other weaknesses identified included the fact that the 
interaction between different EPCs is not catered for and there is no mechanism to address dependence between 
them. Analysts found it difficult to determine explicit criteria for inclusion or exclusion of EPCs. Overall, the 
application of HEART in healthcare would benefit from the development of benchmarks relating or mapping 
specific factors influencing standard errors within Radiotherapy to the HEART EPCs. 
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